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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

STATE OP UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.
vs.
DAVID J. HUNT,
Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NO:

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the Court erred in denying Appellant's

Motion To Suppress because the County Attorney failed to properly
authorize or apply for a Telecommunications Intercept Order and
whether the Order was void on its face because it authorized
interception for a period of time in excess of that permitted by
The Act.
2.

Whether the June 27th Application was fatal as a

result of the absence of any indication that the Deputy County
Attorney was specifically designated by the County Attorney to
make the Application.
3. Whether evidence obtained pursuant to the
Telecommunications Orders should have been suppressed.
4.

Whether Appellant was denied his right to effective

assistance of counsel.
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OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. On
October 5, 1989, judge Davidson filed the opinion affirming the
trial Court in all aspects. A copy of this opinion is attached
to this Petition as "Addendum #1".
JURISDICTION
This Petition For Writ Of Certiorari is brought pursuant
to the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 42. The trial on
this case was before the Weber County Second Judicial District
Court, Judge David Roth presiding, on February 19, 1987.
Appellant was convicted of a second degree felony.

A Notice Of

Appeal was filed but*dismissed June 1, 1987 for failure to
prosecute.

Following a habeas Corpus action, Appellant was

resentenced and filed a new Notice Of Appeal on June 6, 1988. He
was subsequently released on a Certificate of Probable Cause
pending Appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on
October 5, 1989. An Order was signed by Justice Orme, Utah Court
of Appeals, continuing Appellant's Certificate pending a decision
on Appellant's Petition.

Prior to the expiration of the thirty

(30) day period an Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time was made
and a corresponding Order was signed by the Supreme Court extending the time for filing this Petition For Writ Of Certiorari for
ii
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an additional thirty (30) days.

The date of entry of the Order

extending time is October 17, 1989. Jurisdiction is conferred on
this Court pursuant Rule 4 3 (4) of the Utah Rules of the Supreme
Court, in that the Court of Appeals has decided an important
question of state law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this Court.

Therefore, a Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari is

proper.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OP STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Annotated §77-23a-l through 16.

Set out

in its entirety in Appellant's "Addendum #2.
2.

United States Constitution, 6th Amendment:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right....to have the assistance of counsel
for his defense.

3.

Utah Constitution; Article 1, Section 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel...
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Appellant appealed a bench verdict finding him
guilty of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute for
value.

The trial Court denied Appellant's Motion to Suppress on

the grounds that the County Attorneys' failure to sign the
telecommunication's intercept application was not fatal.
iii

Defense
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counsel neglected to object to the Application for an extension
of time during which to intercept phone messages on the grounds
that the application was not made by a Deputy County Attorney
specifically designated by the County Attorney to authorize such
an application.

This failure to object was plain error and

deprived Appellant of his Constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel.

The Utah Court of Appeals, on October 5,

1989, filed an opinion affirming the trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 23, 1986, Judge Wahlquist of Ogden, Utah
signed an Ex Parte Order authorizing the interception of telephonic communications to and from the telephone of Appellant,
(Addendum #3 & T.T. @ Pg. 36). The Order purported to authorize
interception of wire communications commencing on May 29, 1986,
but not to exceed thirty days past June 28, 1986.

This Order is

based on an application that was Notarized but left unsigned by
the Weber County Attorney.
On June 27, 1986, an application for an Ex Parte Order
authorizing the extension of time was made by William F. Daines,
Deputy County Attorney, Weber County, State of Utah, (Addendum
#4).

This application does not specify that Mr.

Daines was a

Deputy County Attorney specifically designated by the County
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Attorney for purposes of §77-23a-8, Utah Code Annotated (1980),
as that section existed at the time of this application.

The

Affidavit attached to the Order indicates that results thus far
obtained from the first interception were unproductive as a
result of the Appellant's absence from town during that period of
time.

All information contained in the Affidavit submitted by

Mr. Daines and the police officer was obtained as a direct result
of the Court's Order dated, but left unsigned, May 23, 1986.
Subsequently, the Court granted a seven day extension of the telecommunications intercept.
Based upon information accumulated during the period of
time which covered the Orders authorizing interception of
wirecommunications to and from the Appellant's phone, police
officers approached the Circuit Court Judge, Brent West, and
secured a Search Warrant for the Appellant's automobiles. (T.T. @
pg. 27). On or about August 9, 1986, the Search Warrant was executed and, pursuant thereto, Appellant's house and vehicles were
searched.

Personal property and cocaine were seized as a result

of the search.

Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged

with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute for value.
On February 19, 1987, the matter came on for trial
before the Honorable David E. Roth, one of the Judges of the
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Second Judicial District, sitting without a jury.

Defense coun-

sel realized that the initial authorization for the telephonic
communication intercept had not been signed by the County
Attorney until approximately two months after the Order had been
signed by Judge Wahlquist, and pursuant to a Nunc Pro Tunc Order.
(T.T. @ pgs. 36 & 40). A Deputy County Attorney then brought to
the attention of the Court that no pre trial motion under Rule
12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, had been filed with regards
to the application. (T.T. @ pg 36). Defense counsel objected to
the admission of any.information pursuant to the Order on the
grounds that the initial thirty days of the tap was simply
inadmissible.

He indicated that he did not know whether or not

the Motion Nunc Pro Tunc would rectify something of this nature,
i.e. whether or not it could validate Judge Wahlquist's Order if,
in fact, signed two months after instituting said Order, but simply objected to the admissibility of any evidence pursuant to
that Order.

Defense counsel had filed a Motion to Suppress the

day before the trial on the matter.

He filed absolutely no sup-

pression motions under the requirements of the Telephonic
Interception Of Communications Act ten days prior to trial on the
matter.
When trial on the matter commenced, defense counsel had
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no authority for his position that the initial wire tap Order was
ineffective as a result of the County Attorney's failure to sign
same. (T.T. @ pg 38). He had not researched the issue even
though he had a copy of the Order for some time prior to trial.
The State, on the other hand, argued to the Court that they had a
plethoria of cases that indicated that it was okay if the
County Attorney did not sign the Application.

Defense counsel

had no authority nor did defense counsel object to the
admissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the second
warrant authorized and applied for by William Daines, Deputy
County Attorney.
Judge Roth denied the Defendant's Motion finding that
the failure to timely sign the Application was not fatal to the
warrant. (T.T. @ pg 41). The trial Judge made no finding as to
whether or not Mr. Daines was a duly authorized Deputy County
Attorney specifically designated by the County Attorney to make
an Application for a wire tap interception order.

Subsequently,

the Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute for value.

The Defendant was sentenced to the Utah

State Prison for an indeterminate amount of time of one to fifteen years.

Defense counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf

nf fh^ npfemdant. but failed to Droceed with the Appeal.

The
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Appeal was dismissed June 1, 1987, and returned to the District
Court for failure to prosecute.

Following a Habeas Corpus action

in Third District Court, the matter was remanded back to Judge
Roth for resentencing in order to permit Appellant the
opportunity to exercise his constitutional and statutory right to
Appeal.

His Notice Of Appeal was subsequently filed June 6,

1988, and Appellant was released from the Utah State Prison following Judge Roth's approval of a certificate of probable cause.
Appellant thus far has spent more than fourteen months in the
Utah State Prison.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the

Defendant's conviction on October 5, 1989. The opinion is
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.

The

Appellant was granted a thirty day extension of time during which
to file his Petition For Writ Of Certiorari.

The Utah Court of

Appeals stayed remitture in this matter pending the Supreme
Courts determination of the Appellant's Petition For Writ.

The

Order is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial Court errored in denying Appellant's Motion To
Suppress All Evidence seized pursuant to the Search Warrant
executed August 9, 1986. The County Attorney's failure to
properly apply for a wire tap Order made said Order defective on
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its face, even in light of the Nunc Pro Tunc Order entered two
months after the fact. The initial application for Wire Tap
Order was not executed properly and the subsequent application
for an extension of that Order had not been authorized by a
Deputy County Attorney "specifically designated" by the County
Attorney to make said applications.

Finally, Appellant was

denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when his
trial attorney failed to adequately represent the issues surrounding the telecommunications interceptions during the trial on
the matter and by failing to properly file a Motion To Suppress
evidence seized pursuant to a Telecommunications Order under the
Telecommunications Act requiring that said Motion be made at
least ten days prior to trial and articulating that the reasons
made for said Motion were the fact that the Deputy County
Attorney was not duly authorized by the County Attorney to make
said application within the four corners of the document presented to the Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY FAILED TO PROPERLY AUTHORIZE
THE ORIGINAL APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER PERMITTING INTERCEPTION OF APPELLANT'S WIRE AND ORAL COMMUNICATIONS IN
VIOLATION OF §77-233-8, U.C-A. (1980). FURTHER, THE
ORDER PURPORTED TO AUTHORIZE INTERCEPTION FOR A PERIOD
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OF TIME IN EXCESS OF THAT SUBMITTED BY THE ACT, VOIDING
THE ORDER.
The Utah Interception Communications Act, U.C.A.
§77-23a-l through 16, as well as its federal counterpart, Title
III of the Ominibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
18 U.S.C. §2510 to 2520, set forth the procedures for authorizing
and approving the interception of wire communications.
§77-23a-8, which was in existence at the time of Appellant's
trial, authorized the County Attorneys or any Deputy County
Attorney specially designated by the County Attorney to authorize
an application for 3 wire or oral telecommunications intercept
order.
The Utah Code requires the government to comply with the
required application procedures or evidence obtained as a result
of such surveillance must be suppressed at the criminal trial.
As the United States Senate reported at the 113th Congressional
Record 21861, concerning Title III, the Act
...Centeralizes in a publicly responsible official subject to the political process the formulation of law
enforcement policy to be used as electronic surveillance
techniques. Centralization will avoid the possibility
that divergent practices might develope. Should abuses
occur, the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. This provision in itself should go a long
way in guaranteeing that no abuses will happen. S.Rep.
1097, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, 96 through 97 (1968).
The procedures followed in securing Court authorization
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to intercept Appellant's telephone communications did not rise to
the level of conformity manditated by Title III, the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation thereof, nor the Utah
Interceptions Act, hereinafter referred to as "The Act".

The

level of compliance obtained by the Weber County Attorney's
Office in this case falls far below that required by the Act and
contemplated by Congress when it passed Title III.
In 1980, §77-23a-8, U.C.A. (1980), clearly required the
County Attorney or a specially designated Deputy County Attorney
to authorize the application for an Order permitting
interception.

In the case at hand, the County Attorney himself

made the application, entitled Application.

He did not sign it

even though it was notarized.
§77-23a-10 (1) (1982) required that the application for
an intercept order be in writing:
Each application for an Order authorizing or approving
the interception of wire or oral communications shall be
made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a Judge of
competent jurisdiction, and shall state the applicants
authority to make the application....
Even though federal law holds that personal approval, or
approval in fact, by the Attorney General of an application for
an intercept order, overcomes facial insufficiencies because of
incorrect signatures or the misidentification of the authorized
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Attorney General, the Act clearly speaks for itself.
tion shall be made in writing upon oath.
not sign his application under oath.

An applica-

Clearly Mr. Hughes did

This is not a case of

misidentification or incorrect signatures.

This is a case where

the application is completely devoid of the signature.

The Court

of Appeals seems to overlook the problem that Mr. Hughes himself
made application to the Court, as opposed to a police officer
making application.

The statute does not permit the County

Attorney to simply authorize and then submit an unsigned, unsworn
to application to the District Court Judge.

The statute is very

specific in requiring a writing upon oath or affirmation.
The Court of Appeals cites U.S. vs. Chavez, 416 U.S.
562 (1974), for the proposition that so long as the County
Attorney is the official who authorized the application, someone
else may sign the application.

There was never any allegation

made in U.S. vs. Chavez that the statutory requirement that the
application be made in writing, under oath was ignored.

To

require anything less than a sworn writing as required by the
statute would effectively destroy the requirement of authorization as it existed in 1980 and provide a convenient means to
escape public accountability.

If the County Attorney decided to

actually make application instead of simply authorize the
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application, it stands to reason that he should be held to the
strict requirements of the statute.
The state's attorney argued, during Appellant's trial,
that the Nunc Pro Tunc Order corrected the defective application,
and so held Judge Roth.

(T.T. @ pg 41).

A decree Nunc Pro Tunc,

however, is to record judicial action taken and not to remedy
inaction. Bruce vs. Bruce, 4 Wash. 2nd 635, 296 P.2d 310.
According to the Court in State vs. Ryan, 146 Wash. 114, 161 P
775, "it may be used to make the record speak the truth, but not
to make it speak what it did not speak".

It cannot, two months

after the fact, heal.an otherwise fatal application for a telecommunications intercept order.

Again, I emphasize the fact that

the County Attorney did not merely authorize the telecommunications intercept order in this case, he actually made application
for that order himself.
The Order signed on May 23, 1986, was not only based
upon writings representing procedural defects effecting the substantive rights of the Defendant, but it was facially void.
§77-23a-10 (5) provides:
No order entered under this section may authorize or
approve the interception of any wire or oral communications for any period longer than is necessary to achieve
the objective of the authorization, nor in any event
longer than thirty days.
The May 23, 1986 order provides:
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This order authorizing the interception of telephonic
communications upon the initial receipt of incriminating
conversations but shall continue until enough evidence
is obtained to accomplish the objectives herein stated,
but in no event shall the authorization to intercept
communications extend longer than thirty days past 0700
hours June 28, 1986, unless a specific extension is
granted by the Court that this is a continuing criminal
enterprise and that there is probable cause to believe
that the communications ought to be intercepted will
continue after the initial period of authorized
interception. (emphasis added)
Likewise, the second order permitting interception
states:
...But in no event shall the authorization extend longer
than the thirty day extension, past 0700 hours July 27,
1986...
Clearly the Order purports to authorize wire communications interception for a period in excess of thirty days and is
void on its face.

Evidence obtained pursuant to the order and

the June 27, 1986 order must be suppressed.

If Defendant's trial

counsel had made himself aware of the statutory manditates with
regards to Title III and the Utah Interception Act, evidence
obtained as a result of the void orders would have been suppressed by the trial Court.

There can be no doubt that the

Defendant was prejudiced by the failure of due diligence on
defense counsel's part.
POINT II
THE JUNE 27, 1986 APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER AUTHORIZING
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THE EXTENSION OF TIME FOR INTERCEPTION OF APPELLANT'S
TELECOMMUNICATIONS WAS NOT AUTHORIZED BY A DEPUTY COUNTY
ATTORNEY SPECIFICALLY DESIGNATED BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY
AS WAS REQUIRED BY §77-23a-8, U.C.A. (1980).
On June 27, 1986, William Daines, Deputy County
Attorney, applied for an Order extending the time during which
the State could intercept Appellant's telecommunications.

The

application nowhere indicates that Mr. Daines was the Deputy
County Attorney specially designated to authorize an application,
nor to make an application for an intercept order at all.
The Court of Appeals, at pg 6 of its opinion attached
hereto, states that "the application is, nevertheless, valid.
Defendant is merely making a Semitic distinction between specially designated and duly authorized".

The application

indicates that Mr. Daines is a duly authorized County Attorney.
This does not meet the requirements of the statute insofar as it
does not indicate that he was specifically designated by the
County Attorney to make applications.

That was a statutory

requirement at the time and was inserted into the statutory,
scheem so that each application for an intercept order may be
passed upon by one of the highest law enforcement officials in
government, and it named them.

Congress and the legislature

expected them to exercise personal judgment, before approving any
applications.

Routine processing by subornates was not to be the
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approach.

More responsibility than that which devolves upon any

department head in any bureaucracy, that is, ultimate responsibility for what subornates do, was required.

It would subvert

the congressional scheme if we were to sanction anything less
that strict compliance, much less the gross departure that has
taken place in this case. As the Court of Appeals points out,
the statute has since been amended to permit any County Attorney
to make application for a wire tap intercept.

However, this was

not the case at the time of Appellant's trial on the matter.
The authorization requirements provided for in The Act
were not mere technicalities; they were at the heart of the legislative scheme.
In U.S. vs. Giordlano, 94 S. Ct. 1823, an Assistant
United States Attorney, Brocoto, submitted an application to a
federal judge for an order permitting interception of the communications of Giordiano.

The application recited that Assistant

Attorney General Will Wilson had been specially designated by the
Attorney General to authorize the application.

Attached to the

application was a letter from Mr. Wilson to Brocoto stating that
Wilson had reviewed the request for authorization, and had made
the necessary probable cause determination and then purported to
authorize Brocoto to proceed with the application to the Court.
Upon reviewing the application, the Judge issued an order author-
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izing the interception "pursuant to application authorized by the
Assistant Attorney General...Will Wilson, specifically designated
by the Attorney General...".

Glordiano at 94 Supreme Court 1823

and 1824.
It developed during Suppression Hearing that the application for interception authority had inaccurately described the
officials who had authorized the application.

Rather than Wilson

having personally authorized the application, the executive
assistant to the Attorney General reviewed the request for
authorization and had concluded, from his "knowledge of the
Attorney General's auctions on previous cases, he would approve
the request if submitted to him".

Thus, the executive caused the

Attorney General's initials to be placed on the Memorandum to
Wilson instructing him to authorize Brocoto to proceed.

Further,

Wilson did not himself sign either of the letters bearing his
name accompanying the applications to the District Court.
Although the scenario of the instant case differed somewhat from the factual background of Giordiano, a reading of the
documents contained in the Addendum discloses similar procedural
irregularities.

First of all, the County Attorney choose to make

the initial application to Judge Walhquist for a wire tap order
as opposed to "authorizing" him, or an investigative or law
enforcement officer to make the application.

The application

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
State of Utah vs. David Hunt
Page Fifteen

made by Hughes should have been signed and a Motion Nunc Pro Tunc
simply could not cure the defect.

Mr. Hughes went a step beyond

authorization insofar as he actually made the application himself
and did not bother to sign or execute it himself prior to entry
of the order.

Strict compliance is a procedural requirement

manditated by The Act and does not permit this kind of haphazard
behavior in securing Court Orders. As stated in Giordiano at 94
Supreme Court 1827,
Investigative personnel may not themselves ask the Judge
for authority to wire tap or eavesdrop. A mature judgment of a particular, responsible....official is interposed as a critical pre-condition to any judicial order,
(emphasis added).
Secondly a Deputy County Attorney attempted to make an
application to the District Court for an order authorizing an
extension of the May 2 3rd wire tap order.

Mr. Daines indicated

in his signed Affidavit that he was a Deputy County Attorney, had
read the Affidavit of the police officer and believed the information contained in the application police officers affidavit to
be true.

Nowhere in his application does he allege that he was

specially designated by the County Attorney to authorize an
application, much less make an application himself.
This is precisely the type of situation contemplated by
law makers prior to enactment of act of Title III and the Utah
Act.

The legislative history outlined in Giodiano supports this
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view.

The Act provides assurance of a reasonable executive

determination of the need and justifiability of each interception
and, it is clear that the authority must be exercised before the
underlined application is presented to a Judge.
As to any affidavits submitted to the Court after the
Wire Tap Orders were signed, the Giodiano Court stated in
Footnote 12 @ 74 S. Ct. 1830:
It would ill serve the Congressional policy of having
the Attorney General or one of his assistants screen the
applications prior to their submission to the Court to
have the screening process occur after the application
is made and after investigative officials have already
begun to intercept wire or oral communications under a
Court Order predicated on the assumption that proper
authorization to apply for the intercept authority had
been given.
POINT III
EVIDENCE OBTAINED PURSUANT TO THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INTERCEPT ORDERS AND CONSEQUENTLY EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A
RESULT OF EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT BASED UPON
INFORMATION OBTAINED DIRECTLY THEREFROM, MUST BE SUPPRESSED PURSUANT TO §77-23a-7 AND §77-23a-10 (8), U.C.A.
(1980).
Because the initial application for an intercept order
was not executed in accordance with statutory requirements and
because the approval of a Deputy County Attorney of the June 27th
application does not comply with statutory requirements, the evidence obtained from the interceptions should have been suppressed
and could not serve as a basis for probable cause in securing a
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subsequent search warrant of Appellant's house.
§77-23a-7 provides that no part of the contents of any
wire or oral communication, and no evidence derived therefrom,
may be received from any proceeding in or before any Court or
other authority of this state,
If disclosure of that information would be in violation
of this chapter.
What disclosures are forbidden, and are subject to Motions To
Suppress, is in turn governed by §77-23a-10 (10)(a), U.C.A.
(1980), which provides for suppression of evidence on the following grounds:
1.

The communication was unlawfully intercepted;

The communications the government offered in support of
the search warrant signed by Judge West for unlawfully intercepted within the meaning of paragraph l above, because the initial application for the intercept order was not executed prior
to the entry of the order and because the application for extension of time during which to intercept Appellant's communication
was not authorized by a Deputy County Attorney specially designated by the County Attorney to authorize the application or to
make application himself.
Even though use of communications intercepted as a
result of either order which I have hereintofore referred may
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result in Constitutional violations, the words "unlawfully
intercepted" are themselves not limited to Constitutional
violations.

Congress intended to require suppression where there

is failure to satisfy any of the statutory requirements that
directly and substantially implement the Congressional intention
to limit the use of wire tap orders.

Giordlano @ 94 S. Ct. 1832.

We are confident that the provisions for pre application
approval was intended to play a central role in the
statutory scheme and that suppression must follow when
it is shown that this statutory requirement has been
ignored, i.d. @ 1832. (emphasis added).
POINT IV
APPELLANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND §12 ARTICLE 1 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH. APPELLANT WAS DENIED
HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE
DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS UPON WHICH THIS APPEAL IS
BASED.
The Utah Telecommunications Statute requires a motion to
suppress pursuant to that statute to be filed ten days prior to
the date of trial.

Defense counsel in this case filed a General

Motion To Suppress only two days before Appellant's trial and
failed to include in that Motion the precise grounds concerning
the application and authorization requirements raised by
Appellant on appeal.

Instead, defense counsel apparently decided

to* "wing it" by bringing procedural irregularities before the
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Court during Appellant's trial.

Defense counsel totally failed

to recognize the fact that Mr. Daines was not specifically designated by the County Attorney to make application for the extension order of June 1987. Defense counsel rendered a deficit
performance and the outcome of the trial would definitely have
been different but for counsel's error.

Trial counsel's failure

to articulate the problems with the State's application and
authorizations was clearly not discretionary.

His position as

the attorney created duties incident thereto and demanded that he
make the necessary inquiries into the State's case.

Here, that

case rested almost inclusively on telecommunication
interceptions.

It was incumbent upon defense counsel to bring to

the attention of the State and to the Court the deficiencies so
obvious in the application in support of the orders for interception of Appellant's communications.

After all, those communica-

tions served as the exclusive source of information in support of
the search warrant.
Although defense counsel apparently recognized some
problems with the application procedure, his recognition was evidently a new discovery and he was ill prepared to argue the
issues. (T.T. @ pgs. 38 through 41).
Although the Court of Appeals recognized that defense
counsel filed a timely Motion To Suppress on the grounds that the
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probable cause statement was insufficient to support the search
warrant, the Court failed to recognize that pursuant to the
Interceptions Act, a Suppression Motion must be filed at least
ten days prior to the time of trial. Additionally, the Court
indicates that defense counsel objected, at length, to the sufficiency of the probable cause statement.
Appellant's argument on Appeal.

That is simply not

Appellant's argument on Appeal

is defense counsels total lack of knowledge of the telecommunications statute and his ability to deal with the suppression issues
arising therefrom at a Suppression Hearing which should have
been heard prior to the day of trial. Additionally, the defense
counsel's complete failure to raise the issue of whether or not
Mr. Daines was specially designated by the County Attorney to
make application and give authorization for the June Order was
never brought to the attention of the Court.

Even though this

issue was raised for the first time on Appeal, it was raised
under exceptional circumstances insofar as the Appellant's right
to effective assistance of counsel is concerned.

This is not a

case where the trial counsel consciously choose a strategy that
differs from that which Appellant's counsel thinks might have
succeeded below, as was the case in State vs. Bullock, 119 Utah
Adv. Rep.

In this case, the trial Court committed plain error in

admitting the evidence obtained as a direct result of a void tel-
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ecommunications order and trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise that objection to the trial Court.

The Appellant

does not have the space herein in order to provide the Court with
the fully briefed issues of harmful error and that the trial
Court's ruling was plainly erroneous. He would appreciate an
opportunity to brief these issues to the Utah Supreme Court as a
result of a grant of this Petition.

Appellant would like the

Supreme Court to assure that justice is done, even if trial counsel failed to act to bring a harmfully erroneously ruling to the
attention of the trial Court.

This is not a case, as was in

Bullock, where a party, through counsel, made a conscious decision to refrain from objecting or lead the trial Court into
error.

Appellant asks that this Court balance the need for pro-

cedural regularities with the demands of fairness and grant
Appellant's Petition.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ v"

day of November,

1989.
RANDINE SALERNO
Attorney at Law
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I do hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing, to: Dan Larsen, Attorney General's Office,
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this
/ S ^ day of Nev^robar, 1989.
RANDINE SALERNO
Attorney at Law
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DAVIDSON, Judge:
Defendant Davijd J. Hunt appeals from a bench trial conviction
for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute
for value. Defendant argues on appeal that the failure of the
county attorney to sign the application for an intercept order
invalidated the application, and therefore, the evidence obtained
pursuant to the order should be suppressed. We affirm,
FACTS
On May 23, 1986, Weber County Attorney Donald C. Hughes, Jr.
filed an application for an order to intercept wire
communications from Hunt's residence. The application was
supported by an affidavit signed by Sergeant Glen Warner, naming
defendant as the main person involved in a drug organization that
purchases and transports cocaine to suppliers along the Wasatch
Front. Hughes inadvertently failed to sign the application. The
omission was not initially noticed and Judge Wahlquist signed the

order authorizing interception of defendant's wire
communications from May 29, 1986 through June 28, 1986. During
that month, however, defendant left Salt Lake City and lived in
California.
On June 27, 1986, Deputy Weber County Attorney William F.
Daines applied for an extension of the intercept order.
Attached to the application was an affidavit submitted by
Sergeant Warner setting forth the results of the first
intercept. Judge Wahlquist granted a thirty-day extension,
from June 28, 1986, through July 27, 1986.
On July 26, 1986, Daines applied for a second extension of
the intercept order from July 27, 1986 through August 3, 1986.
While preparing that application, Daines discovered the
omission of Hughes's signature on the original application.
Hughes filed a motion nunc pro tunc to execute the original
application. Judge Wahlquist granted the nunc pro tunc order
making the execution of the original application effective May
23, 1986, and signed the order for the second extension of the
intercept. The interception of defendant's wire communications
ceased on August 3, 1986.
Based on the information gathered from the interception of
defendant's wire communications, the police learned that a
large drug transaction was about to take place between
defendant and another person in Vista, California. On August
5, 1986, defendant placed a call to the other person and
immediately left for California. Detectives in California
informed the Utah police of defendant's arrival at the Vista
residence.
On August 8, 1986, defendant drove back to Utah followed by
four police cars and a police helicopter. The police obtained
a search warrant for defendant's home and vehicles and on
August 9, 1986, conducted a search. Thirty-four items of
personal property were seized including one pound of cocaine,
scales, scale weights, and a cocaine screen. Defendant was
arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with the intent
to distribute for value.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress all evidence
seized as a result of the search of his home and vehicles
challenging the sufficiency of the probable cause statements in
support of the search warrant. The motion was denied and a
bench trial was held. Defendant's trial counsel objected at
trial to the admission of any evidence obtained as a result of
the intercept orders because they were not properly executed.
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The judge ruled that the omission of the signature was not
fatal to the order and that the nunc pro tunc order remedied
any error. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to prison.
On May 29, 1988, Hughes filed a belated affidavit
establishing his authorization of the application for the
intercept order and his special designation of Daines as being
"duly authorized," pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8
(1982).
Defendant argues on appeal that the failure of the county
attorney to sign the original application for the intercept
order could not be remedied nunc pro tunc and that the order
purported to authorize interception for a period in excess of
that permitted by section 77-23a-10 (1982). Defendant also
argues that the deputy county attorney was not "specially
designated- pursuant to section 77-23a-8 to apply for the
extensions. Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance because these objections were
not timely made.
AUTHORIZATION FOR AN INTERCEPT ORDER
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 to -2520, provides the framework for
the Utah Interception of Communications Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 77-23a-l to -16 (Supp. 1989).1 The Utah Act, as well as
its federal counterpart, set forth the procedure for
authorizing and approving the interception of wire
communications. The version of section 77-23a-8, which was in
effect at the time of trial, authorized the county attorney or
any deputy county attorney, "specially designated" by the
county attorney, to authorize an application for an intercept
order.2 Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10(l) (1982) requires that
an application for an intercept order be in writing:
1. Since the time of trial in this matter, the Utah Interception
of Communications Act was amended by the legislature in both 1988
and 1989.
2. The 1989 amendment eliminated the "special designation"
requirement. County attorneys are no longer required to
"specially designate" deputy county attorneys to authorize
applications for wire interceptions. The 1989 amendment now
authorizes any deputy county attorney to authorize wire
communications interceptions without first obtaining county
attorney approval. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8(l) (Supp. 1989).
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Each application for an order authorizing
or approving the interception of wire or
oral communication shall be made in
writing upon oath or affirmation to a
judge of competent jurisdiction, and shall
state the applicants authority to make
the application . . . .3
Defendant does not take issue with whether the application
properly complied with the substantive requirements of section
77-23a-10(l), but claims that the omission of the county
attorney's signature invalidated the application.
Federal case law holds that personal approval, or approval in
fact, by the Attorney General of an application for an intercept
order, overcomes facial insufficiencies because of incorrect
signatures or the misidentification of the authorizing attorney
general.4 The test is whether the deficiencies are of the type
which "require suppression where there is failure to satisfy any
of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of
intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the
employment of this extraordinary investigative device." United
States v. Lawson, 545 F.2d 557, 562 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting
United States v. Giondeno, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)).
3. The 1988 amendment to section 77-23a-10(l) inserted
"electronic" following "wire" throughout the entire section.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-10 (Supp. 1988). The legislature, in
1989, also amended section 77-23a-10 but none of those changes
affect this appeal.
4. United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United States
v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 859 (1st Cir. 1984) (en banc) ("The
absence of a compelling signature on a critical document can be
remedied by proof of actual authority."); United States v.
Lawson, 545 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Thomas,
508 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975);
United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1974)
(misidentifying assistant attorney general as authorizing person
does not render interceptions unlawful); United States v. Cox,
462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Bowdach, 366 F.
Supp. 1368 (S.D. Fla. 1973); and United States v. Schullo, 363 F.
Supp. 246, 253 (D. Minn. 1973) ("[0]nce the Attorney General
himself has approved an application for electronic surveillance,
further ministerial acts are unimportant.").

A

The United States Supreme Court# in United States v.
Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974), decided whether it was appropriate
to suppress evidence where statutory application procedures for
an intercept order were not fully satisfied. In Chavez, the
application and court order incorrectly identified the
Assistant Attorney General as the authorizing official.
Despite this procedural violation, the Supreme Court determined
that the Attorney General had in fact authorized the
application. The Court held that since there was not a claim
of any constitutional infirmity arising from the defect, Mit
does not follow that because of this deficiency in reporting,
evidence obtained pursuant to the order may not be used at a
trial of respondents." I£. at 570. See £l££ United States v.
Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. at 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (congressional
scheme not violated where deputy attorney general signed order
when attorney general had in fact approved the order). The
Court distinguished its holding in Giordano by stating, "we did
not go so far as to suggest that every failure to comply with
any requirement provided in Title III would render the
interception of wire or oral communications •unlawful.1"
Chavez, 416 U.S. at 574-75.
In determining whether technical violations rise to the
level of constitutional infirmities, consideration of the
rationale behind the procedural requirements in the Utah Act is
important. Section 2518 of Title III, comparable to section
77-23a-10 of the Utah Act, "was designed to affix the lines of
responsibility as a corollary to promoting a uniform policy in
wire interception." Bowdach, 366 F. Supp. at 1373.
"[A]lthough considerations of centralization and uniformity of
decision-making are adjuncts to the protection of privacy,
those considerations do not reach the level of constitutional
status." !£. The purpose behind section 2516 of Title III,
comparable to section 77-23a-8, requiring identification of the
authorizing official in the application, "facilitates the
court's ability to conclude that the application has been
properly approved," and also fixes responsibility for the
source of preliminary approval. Chavez, 416 U.S. at 575.
Defendant argues that to require anything less than a sworn
writing would effectively destroy the requirement of
authorization and provide a convenient means to escape public
accountability. However, there was ample evidence to show that
Hughes did in fact approve the application for the intercept
order, and is clearly accountable for such authorization. The
application identified Hughes numerous times as the one
authorizing the application and he submitted an affidavit
attesting to the fact that he approved the applications. By

oonoor
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inadvertently omitting his signature# Hughes did not compromise
the privacy of wire and oral communications as provided in
section 77-23a-2 (1982)•
"SPECIALLY DESIGNATED" DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
Defendant contends that the applications for extensions of
time for the interceptions were not authorized by a "deputy
county attorney specially designated by the county attorney" in
accordance with section 77-23a-8 (1982):
[A]ny county attorney or any deputy county
attorney specially designated by the
county attorney, may authorize an
application to a Utah State district court
judge of competent jurisdiction for, and
the judge may grant • . . an order
authorizing or approving the interception
of a wire or oral communication • • • .
(emphasis added,)5
This issue is raised for the first time on appeal and "[i]n
the absence of exceptional circumstances, [Utah appellate
courts have] long refused to review matters raised for the
first time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was
made in the trial court." State v. Loe. 732 P.2d 115, 117
(Utah 1987). Even if this issue had been raised below, the
application is, nevertheless, valid. Defendant is merely
making a semantic distinction between "specially designated"
and "duly authorized." The application for the extension
stated that Deputy County Attorney William F. Daines is "duly
5. The amended portion of section 77-23a-8 currently appears as
follows:
The attorney general of the state or any
assistant attorney general, or any county
attorney or deputy county attorney may
authorize an application to a judge of
competent jurisdiction for an order for an
interception of wire, electronic, or oral
communications. . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-8 (Supp. 1989).
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authorized by Donald C. Hughes, Weber County Attorney, to make
this application." In light of the foregoing analysis, this
distinction is meritless.
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant finally claims ineffective assistance of
counsel. In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the
defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but
for counselfs error.- State v. Gearv, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah
1985). &££ fllSQ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). Failure to show either deficient performance or
resulting prejudice will defeat a claim of ineffective
counsel. Geary, 707 P.2d at 646. The Utah Supreme Court
recently applied the Strickland test in State v. Archuleta, 747
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987):
Before this Court will consider whether
specific conduct falls below the required
standard of objective reasonableness, the
person arguing ineffective assistance must
show that the conduct prejudiced his case.
. . . (citations omitted). In order to
prove prejudice to his case, "defendant
must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Xfi. at 1023 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective
for the following reasons: (1) he failed to file a timely
motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence; (2) he
failed to object to the sufficiency of the probable cause
statement in support of the search warrant; (3) he failed to
object to the sufficiency of the affidavit in support of the
intercept order; and (4) he failed to articulate and support
his objection to certain evidence.
Defendant's first two claims are inconsistent with the
trial record as it appears before us. Trial counsel filed a
timely motion to suppress on the ground that the probable cause
statement was insufficient to support the search warrant. At
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trial, counsel also objected, at length, to the sufficiency of
the probable cause statement. Both the motion and the
objections were denied. We defer to trial counselfs
professional judgment and trial strategy in not pursuing this
line of objection. See State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023
(Utah 1987). "Decisions as to what witnesses to call, what
objections to make, and, by and large, what defenses to
interpose, are generally left to the professional judgment of
counsel." State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982), cert.
a£ni£ll, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
We are not persuaded that defendant's trial counsel was
ineffective. Even if all of defendant's claims were true, we
are not persuaded that the outcome would have been different.
The governing legal standard plays a
critical role in defining the question to
be asked in assessing the prejudice from
counsel's errors. When a defendant
challenges a conviction, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability
that, absent the errors, the fact finder
would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt.
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 695.
The trial court found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. The evidence amply supports this finding.
/ ^

/?

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

/•••-

..*•*

r^

*

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Judith M. Billings, Judge
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UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

n o t The magistrate may direct that specific
awoixfcaadfl* 6* m*d* ca du mumat Zfpoa ^
proval, the magistrate shall direct the law %n.
forcement officer or the prosecuting attorney f^.'
the government who ia requesting the warrant to
sign the magistrate's name on the warrant TJyg
warrant shall be called a duplicate original w ^ .
rant and shall be deemed a warrant for purpo^g
of this chapter. In such cases the magistrate ah^ji
cause to be made an original warrant. The rn^g.
iatrate shall enter the exact time of issuance 0 f
the duplicate original warrant on the face of the
original warrant.
(b) Return of a duplicate original warrant *\nd
the original warrant shall be in conformity w ^
this chapter. Upon return, the magistrate sh^jj
require the person who gave the sworn oral t e ^ .
mony establishing the grounds for issuance of the
warrant to sign a copy of the transcript.
(3) If probable cause is shown, the magistrate sh^ji
issue a search warrant
lego

194

partznent or other enclosure, the officer executing the
wamnt may am mich m m as is reaaonao/v nscesaary to enter
(1) If, after notice of his authority and purpose,
there is no response or he is not admitted with
reasonable promptness; or
(2) Without notice of his authority and pur*
pose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon
proof, under oath, that the object of the search
may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to any
person if notice were given.
lseo

77-23-11. Violation of health, safety, building or
animal cruelty laws or ordinances —
Warrants to obtain evidence.
In addition to other warrants provided by this
chapter, magistrates, upon a showing of probable
cause to believe a state, county, or city law, or ordinance has been violated in relation to health, safety,
77*23-6. Time for service — Officer may requ*gt building, or animal cruelty, may issue a warrant for
assistance.
"
the purpose of obtaining evidence of such violation.
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in the Such warrants may be obtained from a magistrate
warrant that it be served in the daytime, unless the upon request of peace officers and state, county, and
affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable ca\ U6 municipal health,firm,building, and animal control
U> h§jj#y» j search is nerwsaary m the mjht tc a * ^ personnel on)? s/Ur MpprovwJ by g pnmtcuting sttorthe property pnor to it being concealed, destroy^ ney. A search warrant issued under this section shall
damaged or altered, or for other good reason; m w h ^ be directed to any peace officer within the county
case he may insert a direction that it be served a^y where the warrant is to be executed, who shall serve
time of the day or night An officer may request ott\er the same. Other concerned personnel may accompany
persons to assist him in conducting the search.
the officer.
lseo
(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten
days from the date of issuance. Any search warr^nt 77-23-12. Evidence seized pursuant to warrant
not excluded unless unlawful aearch
not executed within such tune shall be void and shell
or seizure substantial — "Substantial"
be returned to the court or magistrate as not e ^
defined.
cuted.
i|eo
Pursuant to the standards deecribed in Section
77-23-6. Receipt for property taken.
77-36- 12(g) property or evidence seized pursuant to a
When the officer seizes property pursuant to a search warrant shall not be suppressed at a motion,
aearch warrant t e shall give a receipt to the p e r ^ trial, or other proceeding unless the unlawful conduct
from whom it was seized or in whoee possession it *vM of the peace officer is shown to be substantial. Any
found. If no person is present the officer shall le^ ve unlawful search or seizure shall be considered subthe receipt in the place where he found the property
stantial and in bad faith if the warrant waa obtained
Failure to give or leave a receipt shall not render ^ e with malicious purpose and without probable cause or
evidence seized inadmissible at trial.
xmo was executed maliciously and willfully beyond the
77*23-7. Return — Inventory of property t a k t ^ authority of the warrant or with unnecessary severlsas
The officer, after execution of the warrant sh^u ity,
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to \^t
CHAPTER 23a
magistrate and deliver a written inventory of a^v.
thing seised, stating the place where it is being h ^
INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS
*sso

77*23-6. Safekeeping of property.
l b s officer seizing the property shall be responsible
for its safekeeping and maintenance until the coi^
otherwise orders.
lgeo
77-23-9. Return of papers to district court
The magistrate shall annex to the depositions an(j
affidavits upon which the search warrant is based t^c
search warrant the return, and the inventory, hopW.
ever, if he is without authority to proceed funl l e r
with respect to the offense under which the warr«\nt
was issued, he shall return them to the appropni^
court of the county having jurisdiction within 15 d\ v a
after the return.
iM
77-23-10. Force uaed in executing warrant _
Notice of authority prerequisite, w h ^
When a search warrant has been issued authoi^!
ing entry into any building, room, conveyance, «\ m .
-1

_

Section
77-23a-L
77-23a-2.
77-23a-3.
77-23a-4.
77-23a-5.

Short title.
Legislative findings.
Definitions.
Offenses — Lawful interception.
Traffic in intercepting devices — Offenses — Lawful activities.
77-23a-6. Seizure and forfeiture of intercepting devices.
77-23a-7.
Evidence — Exclusionary rule.
77-23a-&. Court order to authorise or approve interception — Procedure.
77-23a-9. Disclosure or use of intercepted information.
77-23a-10. Application for order — Authority of order — Emergency action — Application — Entry — Conditions — Extensions — Recordings — Admissibility
or suppression — Appeal by state.
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Section
77-23a-li.

Civil remedy for unlawful interception
— Action for relief.
77.23a.12. Enjoining a violation — Civil action by
attorney general.
77-23a-13. Installation of device when court order
required — Penalty.
77-23a-U Court order for installation — Application.
77-23a-15. Order for installation — Contents —
Duration — Extension — Disclosure.
77.23a.16. Communications provider — Cooperation and support services — Compensation — Liability defense.
77-23a.l. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the
"Interception of Communications Act.**
isso
77-23a-2. Legislative findings.
The legislature finds and determines that:
(1) Wire communications are normally conducted through facilities which form part of an
interstate network. The same facilities are used
for interstate and intrastate communications.
(2) In order to protect effectively the privacy of
wire and oral communications, to protect the integrity of court and administrative proceedings,
and to prevent the obstruction of intrastate com*
merce, it is necessary for the legislature to define
the circumstances and conditions under which
the interception of wire and oral communications
may be authorized and to prohibit any unauthorized interception of these communications and
the use of the contents thereof in evidence in
courts and administrative proceedings.
(3) Organized criminals make extensive use of
wire and oral communications in their criminal
activities. The interception of such communications to obtain evidence of the commission of
crimes or to prevent their commission IB an indispensable aid to law enforcement and the administration of justice.
(4) TQ safeguard the privacy of innocent persons, the interception of wire or oral communications when none of the parties to the communication has consented to the interception should be
allowed only when authorized by a court of competent jurisdiction and should remain under the
control and supervision of the authorizing court.
Interception of wire and oral communications
should further be limited to certain major types
of offenses and specific categories of crime with
assurance that the interception is justified and
that the information obtained thereby will not be
misused.
itso
77-23a-3. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Aggrieved person" means a person who
was a party to any intercepted wire, electronic, or
oral communication, or a person against whom
the interception was directed.
(2) "Aural transfer" means any transfer containing the human voice at any point between
and including the point of origin and the point of
reception.
(3) "Communications common carrier" means
any person engaged as a common carrier for hire,
in intrastate, interstate, or foreign communication, by wire or radio, including a provider of
electronic communication service, but s person
engaged in radio broadcasting is not, when that
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person is so engaged, deemed a communications
common carrier.
(4) "Contents" when used with respect to any
wire, electronic or oral communication, includes
any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.
(5) "Electronic communication" means any
transfer of signs, signals, writings, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photo-optical
system, but does not include:
(a) the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and
the base unit;
(b) any wire or oral communications;
(c) any communication made through a
tone only paging device; or
(d) any communication from an electronic
or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object
(6) "Electronic
communications
service"
means any service that provides for users the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.
(7) "Electronic
communications
system"
means any wire, radio, electromagnetic,
photoelectronic or photo-optical facilities for the
transmission of electronic communications, and
any computer facilities or related electronic
equipment for the electronic storage of the communicatioxL
(8) "Electronic mechanical, or other device"
means any device or apparatus that may be used
to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication other than:
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component of them:
(i) furnished to the subscriber or user
by a provider of wire or electronic communications service in the ordinary
course of its business and being used by
the subscriber or user in the ordinary
course of its business; or
(ii) being used by a provider of wire or
electronic communications service in the
ordinary course of its business, or by an
investigative or law enforcement officer
in the ordinary course of his duties; or
(b) a hearing aid or similar device being
used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal.
(9) "Electronic storage" means:
(a) any temporary intermediate storage of
a wire or electronic communication incident
to the electronic transmission of it; and
(b) any storage of the communication by
an electronic communications service for the
purposes of backup protection of the communication.
(10) Intercept" means the aural acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic
marhsniral, or other device.
(11) "Investigative or law enforcement officer"
moans any officer of the state or a political subdivision, who by law may conduct investigations o£
or make arrests for, offenses enumerated in this
chapter, and any attorney authorised by law to
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proeecute or participate in the proeecuUon of
(b) "Wire communication'* does not intheae offenses.
clude the radio portion of a cordless tele(12) kludge ofcompeUntjurismction" means a
phone communication that is transmitted bejudge of a district court of the ftate.
tween the cordless telephone handset and
(13) "Oral communication" meana any oral
the base unit
teas
communication uttered by a person exhibiting an
expectation that the communication is not sub- 77-23a-4. Offenaea — Lawful interception,
(1) Except aa otherwise specifically provided in
ject to interception, under circumstances justifying that expectation, but does not include any this chapter, any person who does any of the following ia guilty of a felony of the third degree:
electronic communication.
(a) intentionally or knowingly intercept*, en(14) Ten register" means a device which
deavors to intercept, or procures any other person
records or decodes electronic or other impulses
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
which identify the numbers dialed or otherwise
electronic, or oral communication;
transmitted on the telephone line to which the
(b) intentionally or knowingly usee, endeavors
device is attached, but does not include any deto use, or procures any other person to use or
vice used by a provider or customer of a wire or
endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or
electronic communication service for billing, or
other device to intercept any oral communicarecording aa an incident to billing, for communition, when:
cations services provided by the provider or any
device used by a provider or customer of a wire
(i) the device ia affixed to, or otherwise
communications service for cost accounting or
transmits a signal through a wire, cable, or
other like purposes in the ordinary course of ita
other like connection used in wire communibusiness.
cation; or .
(ii) the device transmits communications
(15) Tenon" means any employee or agent of
by radio, or interferes with the transmission
the state or a political subdivision, and any indiof the communication;
vidual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation.
(c) intentionally or knowingly discloses, or en(16) "Readily accessible to the general public"
deavors to disclose, to any other person the conmeans, regarding a radio communication, that
tents of any wire, electronic or oral communicathe communication is not:
tion, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through the intercep(a) scrambled or encrypted;
tion of a wire, electronic, or oral communication
(b) transmitted using modulation techin violation of this section; or
niques whose essential parameters have
been withheld from the public with the in(d) intentionally or knowingly uses, or entention of preserving the privacy of the comdeavors to use, the contents of any wire, elecmunication;
tronic, or oral communication, knowing or hav(c) carried on a subcamer or signal subing reason to know that the information waa obsidiary to a radio transmission;
tained through the interception of a wire, elec(d) transmitted over a communications
tronic, or oral communication in violation of this
system provided by a common earner, unless
section.
the communication is a tone only paging sys(2) (a) The operator of a switchboard, or an officer,
tem communication; or
employee, or agent of a provider of wire or elec(%) transmitted on frequencies allocated
tronic communication service, whose facilities
under Part 25, Subpart D, E, or F of Part 74,
are used in the transmission of a wire communior Part 94, Rules of the Federal Communicacation, may intercept, disclose, or use that comtions Commission, unless in the case of a
munication in the normal course of his employcommunication transmitted on a frequency
ment while engaged in any activity which ia a
allocated under Part 74 that is not exclunecessary incident to the rendition of his service
sively allocated to broadcast auxiliary seror to the protection of the rights or property of
vice*, the communication is a two-way voice
the provider of that service, except a provider of
communication by radio.
wire communications service to the public may
(17) Trap and trace device" means a device
not utilize service observing or random monitorthat captures the incoming electronic or other
ing except for mechanical or service quality conimpulses that identify the originating number of
trol checks.
an instrument or device from which a wire or
(b) Providers of wire or electronic communicaelectronic communication is transmitted.
tions service, their officers, employees, agents,
(18) 'User* means any person or entity who:
landlords, custodians, or other persona, may pro(a) uses an electronic communications servide information, facilities, or technical assisvice; and
tance to persona authorised by law to intercept
(b) is authorized by the provider of the serwire, oral, or electronic communications or to
vice to engage in the use.
conduct electronic surveillance, if the provider,
(19) (a) "Wire communication" means any auita officers, employees, agents, landlords, custoral transfer communication made m whole
dians, or other specified persons has been proor in part through the use of facilities for the
vided with:
transmission of communications by the aid
(i) a court order directing the assistance
of wire, cable, or other like connection besigned by the authorising judge; or
tween the point of origin and the point of
(ii) a eamfication in writing by a person
reception furnished or operated by any perspecified in Subsection 77-23a-l<X7), or by
son engaged aa a common carrier in providthe attorney general of the state, a deputy
ing or operating these facilities for the transattorney general, or by a county attorney, or
mission of intrastate, interstate, or foreign
by a deputy county attorney, that no warrant
communications.
or court order ia required by law, that all
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statutory requirement! have been met, and
tart. the. loaofted asa\iitanc» la reclined.
(c) The order or certification shall set forth the
period of tune during which the provision of the
information, facilities, or technical assistance is
authorized, and shall specify the information, facilities, or technical assistance required
(d) The provider of wire or electronic communications service, or its officers, employees,
agents, landlords, custodians, or other specified
persons may not disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the device used to
accomplish the interception or surveillance regarding which the person has been furnished an
order or certification under this section, except as
is otherwise required by legal process, and then
only after prior notification to the attorney general of the state or to the county attorney of the
county in which the interception was conducted,
as is appropriate
(e) Any disclosure under Subeection- (2)(d) renders the person liable for civil damages under
Section 77-23a-U
(f) A cause of action does not he in any court
against any provider of wire or electronic communications service, its officers, employees,
agents, landlords, custodians, or other specified
persons for providing information, facilities, or
assistance in accordance with the terms of a
court order or certification under this chapter
(g) Subsections (2Kb) through (f) supersede
any law to the contrary
(h) A person acting under color of law may intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication,
if that person is a party to the communication, or
one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to the interception
(1) A person not acting under color of law may
intercept a wire or oral communication if that
person is a party to the communication or where
one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to the interception, unless
the communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of state or federal laws
(j) An employee of a telephone company may
intercept a wire communication for the sole purpose of tracing the ongm of the communication
when the interception is requested by the recipient of the communication and the recipient alleges that the communication is obscene, harassing, or threatening in nature The individual conducting the interception shall notify local police
authorities within 48 hours after the time of interception,
(k) A person may
(1) intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communications system that is configured so
that the electronic communication is readily
accessible to the general public,
(u) intercept any radio communication
when it is transmitted by
(A) any station for the use of the general pubbc, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles, or persons in distress,
(B) any government, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile,
or public safety communications system,
including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public,
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(C) a station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens' band, or
general mobile radio services; or
(D) by a marine or aeronautics communications system,
(ui) intercept any wire or electronic communication, the transmission of which is
causing harmful interference to any lawfully
operating station or consumer electronic
equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of the interference, or
dv) as one of a group of users of the same
frequency, intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged
in the provision or the use of the system, if
the communication is not scrambled or
encrypted
(1) Under Sections 77-23a-3 through 77-23s-11
a person may
d) use a pen register or trap and trace device, or
(u) as a provider of electronic communications service, record the fact that a wire or
electronic communication was initiated or
completed, to protect the provider, another
^QK\da& tassjahuui «KS<C\S* <firc«s4><ha. <sv3^
pletion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful, or abusive use of the service
(3) (a) Except under Subeection (3Kb), a person or
entity providing an electronic communications
service to the public may not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication, other
than the one to the person or entity, or its agent,
while m transmission on that service to any person or entity other than an addressee or intended
recipient of the communication or his agent
(b) A person or entity providing electronic
communications service to the public may divulge the contents of any communication.
(l) aa otherwise authorized under Subsection (2), or Section 77-23a-9,
(u) with lawful consent of the originator
or any addressee or intended recipient of the
communication,
(m) to a person employed or authorized, or
whose facilities are used, to forward the communication to its destination, or
(iv) that is inadvertently obtained by the
service provider and appears to pertain to
the commission of a crime, if the divulgence
ia made to a law enforcement esjtacv,
(4) (a) Except under Subeection (4Kb) or Subsection (5), a violation of Subeection (1) is a third
degree felony
(b) If the offense is a first offense under Subsection (4Xa) and is not for a tortious or illegal
purpose or for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private commercial gain,
and the wire or electronic communication regarding which the offense under Subeection (4Ka) is a
radio communication that is not scrambled or
encrypted, and
d) if the communication is not the radio
portion of a cellular telephone communication, a public land mobile radio service communication, or paging service communication, and the conduct is not under Subsection
(5), the offense is a class A misdemeanor,
and
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(ii) if the communication is the radio porthe purpose of the surreptitious interception of
tion of s cellular telephone communication, a
wire, electronic, or oral communications; or
public land mobile radio service communica(c) places in any newspaper, magazine, handtion, or a paging service communication, the
bill, or other publication any advertisement of:
offense is a class B misdemeanor,
(i) any electronic, mechanical, or other de(c) Conduct otherwise an offense under this
vice knowing or having reason to know that
subsection, that consists of or relates to the interthe design of the device renders it primarily
ception of a satellite transmission that i§ not
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious
encrypted or scrambled and that is transmitted:
interception of wire, electronic, or oral communications; or
(i) to a broadcasting station for purposes
(ii) any other electronic, mechanical, or
of retransmission to the general public; or
other device, where the advertisement pro(ii) as an audio subcarrier intended for remotes the use of the device for the purpose of
distribution to facilities open to the public,
the surreptitious interception of wire, elecbut not including data transmissions or teletronic, or oral communications.
phone calls, is not an offense under this sub(2) A provider of wire or electronic communicasection unless the conduct is for the purpose
of direct or indirect commercial advantage or tions service or an officer, agent, or employee of, or a
person under contract with the provider, may in the
private financial gain.
normal course of the business of providing that wire
(5) (a) If the communication is a:
(i) private satellite video communication dr electronic communications service, or an officer,
that is not scrambled or encrypted, and the agent, or employee of, or a person under contract
conduct in violation of this chapter iB the pri- with, the United States, a state, or a political subdivivate viewing of that communication and is sion, in the normal course of the activities of the
not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for United States, a state, or a political subdivision, to
purposes of direct or indirect commercial ad- send through the mail, send or carry in intrastate,
interstate, or foreign commerce, or manufacture, asvantage or private commercial gain; or
(ii) a radio communication that is trans- semble, pooaesi, or sell any electronic, mechanical, or
mitted on frequencies allocated under Sub- other device knowing or having reason to know that
part D, Part 74, Rules of the Federal Com- the design of the device renders it primarily useful for
munication Commission, that is not scram- the purpose of surreptitious mterception of wire, elecisss
bled or encrypted and the conduct in viola- tronic, or oral communications.
tion of this chapter is not for a tortious or
illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or 77-23a-6. Seizure and forfeiture of intercepting
device*.
indirect commercial advantage or private
Any electronic, mechanical or other device used,
commercial gain, then the person who engages in the conduct is subject to suit by the sent, carried, manufactured, assembled, possessed,
sold, or advertised in violation of Sections 77-23a-4
state in a court of competent jurisdiction.
and 77-23a-5, may be seized andforfeitedto the State
(b) In an action under Subsection (5)(a):
ofUtah.
isss
(i) If the violation of this chapter is a first
offense under Subsection (I) and the person 77-23a-7. Evidence — Exclusionary role.
is not found liable in a civil action under
When any wire, electronic or oral communication
Section 77-23a-11, the state may seek appro- has been intercepted, no part of the contents of the
priate injunctive relief.
communication and no evidence derived from it may
(ii) If the violation of this chapter is a sec- be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other
ond or subsequent offense under Subsection proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, depart(1), or the person has been found liable in ment, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative
any prior civil action under Section committee, or other authority of the state, or a politi77-23a-ll, the person is subject to a manda- cal subdivision of the state, if the disclosure of that
tory $500 civil fine.
information would be in violation of this chapter.
(c) The court may use any means within its
authority to enforce an injunction issued under
Subsection (5XbMi), and shall impose a civil fine 77-23a-& Court order to authorise or approve
Interception — Procedure.
of not less than $500 for each violation of the
The attorney general of the state, or any assistant
injunction.
isss
attorney general specially designated by the attorney
T7*23a-5. Traffic in intercepting devices — Of- general or any county attorney or any deputy county
fenses — Lawful activities.
attorney specially designated by the county attorney,
(I) Except as otherwise specifically provided in may authorise an application to a judge of competent
this chapter, any person who intentionally does any jurisdiction for, and the judge may grant in conforof the following i§ guilty of a felony of the third de- mity with the procedures for interception of wire,
gree:
electronic or oral communications by any law en(a) tends through the mail, or sends or carries forcement agency of this state or any political subdiin intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce. visions responsible for the investigation of the type of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device, offense regarding which the application is made, an
knowing or having reason to know that the de- order authorizing or approving the interception of a
sign of the device renders it primarily useful for wire, electronic, or oral communication by any law
the purpose of the surreptitious interception of enforcement agency of this state or any political subdivision responsible for investigation of the offense
wire, electronic, or oral communications;
(b) manufactures, assembles, possesses, or for which the application IM made, when the intercepsells any electronic, mechanical, or other device, tion sought may provide or has provided evidence of
knowing or having reason to know that the de- the commission of the offense of murder, kidnapping,
sign of the device renders it primarily useful for gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
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(i) details regarding the particular offense
that has been, is being, or is about to be com*
mitted,
(n) except as provided in Subsection (11),
a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the
T7-23a-9. Disclosure or use of intercepted inforplace where the communication is to be inmation.
tercepted,
(1) Any investigative or law enforcement officer
(in) a particular description of the type of
who, by any means authorized by this chapter, has
communication sought to be intercepted, and
obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, elec(IV) the identity of the person, if known,
tronic, or oral communication or evidence derived
committing the offense and whose communifrom any of these may disclose those contents to ancation is to be intercepted,
other investigative or law enforcement officer to the
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether
extent that the disclosure is appropriate to the proper
other investigative procedures have been tried
performance of the official duties of the officer makand failed or why they reasonably appear to be
ing or receiving the disclosure
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer
(d) a statement of the period of tune for which
who, by any means authorized by this chapter has
the interception is required to be maintained,
obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, elecand if the nature of the investigation is such that
tronic, or oral communication or evidence derived
the authorization for interception should not aufrom any of them may use those contents to the extomatically terminate when the described type of
tent the use is appropriate to the proper performance
communication has been first obtained, a particof his official duties
ular description of facts establishing probable
(3) Any person who has received, by any means
cause to believe that additional communications
authorized by this chapter, any information concernof the same type will occur thereafter,
ing a wire, electronic, or oral communication or evi(e) a full and complete statement of the facts
dence derived from any of them intercepted in accorconcerning sll previous applications known to
dance with this chapter may disclose the contents of
the individual authorizing and the individual
that communication or the derivative evidence while
making the application, made to any judge for
giving testimony under oath or affirmation m any
authorization to intercept, or for approval of inproceeding held under the authority of the United
terceptions of wire, electronic or oral communiStates or of any state or political subdivision
cations involving any of the same persons, facili(4) An otherwise privileged wire, electronic or oral
ties, or places specified in the application, and
communication intercepted in accordance with or in
the action taken by the judge on each applicaviolation of, the provisions of this chapter does not
tion,
lose its privileged character
(f) when the application is for the extension of
(5) When an investigative or law enforcement offian order, a statement setting forth the results so
cer, while engaged in intercepting wire, electronic, or
for obtained from the interception, or a reason*
oral communications in the manner authorized, inable explanation of the failure to obtain results;
tercepts wire, electronic, or oral communications reand
lating to offenses other than those specified in the
(g) additional testimony or documentary eviorder of authorization or approval, the contents, and
dence
in support of the application as the judge
evidence derived from the contents may be disclosed
may require
or used as provided in Subsections (1) and (2) The
(2) Upon application, the judge may enter an ex
contents and any evidence derived from them may be
used under Subsection (3) when authorized or ap- parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing
proved by a judge of competent jurisdiction if the or approving interception of wire, electronic, or oral
judge finds on subsequent application that the con- communications within the territorial jurisdiction of
tents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the state, if the judge determines on the beau of the
this chapter The application shall be made as soon as facts submitted by the applicant that
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an
practicable.
less
individual is committing, has committed, or is
77-23a-10. Application for order — Authority of
about to commit a particular offense enumerated
order — Emergency action — Applicain Section T7-23a-8,
tion — Entry — Conditions — Exten(b) there is probable cause for belief that parsions — Recordings — Admissibility or
ticular communications concerning that offense
suppression — Appeal by state.
will be obtained through the mterception,
(1) Each application for an order authorizing or ap^c) normal investigative procedures have been
proving the interception of a wire, electronic or oral
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be
communication shall be made in writing upon oath or
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,
affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction, and
(d) except under Subsection (11), there is probshall state the applicant's authority to make the apable cause for belief that the facilities from
plication. Each application shall include the followwhich, or the place where, the wire, electronic, or
me
oral communications are to be intercepted are
(a) the identity of the investigative or law enbeing used, or are about to be used, in connection
forcement officer making the application, and the
with the commission of the offense, or are leased
officer authorizing the application,
to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by
(b) a full and complete statement of the facts
that person
and circumstances relied upon by the applicant
(3) Each order authorizing or approving the interto justify his belief that an order should be is- ception of any wire, electronic, or oral communication
sued, including*
shall specify-

narcotic drugs, marihuana, or other dangerous drugs,
or other offense dangerous to life, limb, or property,
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, or any conspiracy to commit any of these offenses
its*
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(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose
(6) When an order authorizing interception la encommunications are to be intercepted,
tered under this chapter, the order may require re(b) except as provided in Subsection (11), the ports to be made to the judge who issued the order,
nature and location of the communications facili- showing what progress has been made toward
ties as to which, or the place where, authority to achievement of the authorized objective and the need
for continued interception These reports shall be
intercept is granted,
(c) a particular description of the type of com- made at intervals the judge may require
(7) Notwithstanding any other provision of this
munication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates, chapter, any investigative or law enforcement officer,
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to in- designated by the attorney general of the state, a deptercept the communications, and of the persons uty attorney general, a county attorney, or a deputy
county attorney, acting pursuant to a state statute,
authorizing the application, and
(e) the period of time during which the inter- who reasonsbly determines that
• (a) an emergency situation exists that inception is authorized, including a statement as to
volves
whether the interception shall automatically terd) immediate danger of death or serious
minate when the described communication has
physical injury to any person,
been first obtained
<u) conspiratorial activities threatening
(4) An order authorizing the interception of a wire,
the national security interest, or
electronic, or oral communication shall, upon request
(in) conspiratorial activities characteristic
of the applicant, direct that a provider of wire or elecof organized crime, that require a wire, electronic communications service, landlord, custodian,
tronic, or oral communication to be interor other person shall furnish the applicant forthwith
cepted before an order authorizing intercepall information, facilities, and technical assistance
tion can, with diligence, be obtained, and
necessary to accomplish the interception unobtru(b) there are grounds upon which an order
sively and with a minimum of interference with the
could be entered under this chapter to authorise
services that the provider, landlord, custodian, or perthe interception, may intercept wire, electronic,
son is according the person whose communications
or oral communication if an application for an
are to be intercepted Any provider of wire or elecorder approving the interception is made in actronic communications service, landlord, custodian,
cordance with this section, within 48 hours after
or other person furnishing the facilities or technical
the interception has occurred, or begins to occur
assistance shall be compensated by the applicant for
In the absence of an order, the interception
reasonable expenses involved in providing the facilishall immediately terminate when the communities or systems
cation sought is obtained or when the application
(5) (a) An order entered under this chapter may
for the order is denied, whichever is earlier If the
not authorize or approve the interception of any
application for approval is denied, or in any other
wire, electronic, or oral communication for any
case where the interception is terminated withperiod longer than is necessary to achieve the
out an order having been issued, the contents of
objective of the authorization, nor in any event
any wire, electronic, or oral communication inlonger than 30 days The 30 day period begins on
tercepted shall be treated as having been obthe day the investigative or law enforcement offitained in violation of this chapter, and an invencer first begins to conduct an interception under
tory shall be served aa provided for in Subsection
the order, or ten days after the order is entered,
(8Xd) on the person named in the application.
whichever is earlier
(8) (a) The contents of any wire, electronic or oral
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted, but
communication intercepted by any means authoonly upon application for an extension made unrized by this chapter shall, if possible, be reder Subsection (1), and if the court makes the
corded on tape or wire or other comparable defindings required by Subsection (2) The period of
vice The recording of the contents of any wire,
extension may be no longer than the authorizing
electronic or oral communication under this subjudge deems necessary to achieve the purposes
section shall be done so as to protect the recordfor which it was granted, but in no event for loning from editing or other alterations. Immediger than 30 days
ately upon the expiration of the period of an or(c) Every order and extension shall contain a
der, or extension, the recordings shall be made
provision that the authorization to intercept
available to the judge issuing the order and
shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be
sealed under his directions Custody of the reconducted so as to minimize the interception of
cordings shall be where the judge orders The recommunications not otherwise subject to intercordings may not be destroyed, except upon an
ception under this chapter, and must terminate
order of the issuing or denying judge In any
upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in
•vent, it shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate
any event within 30 days
recordings may be made for use or disclosure un(d) If the intercepted communication is in a
der Subsection* 77-23a-9(l) and (2) for investigacode or foreign language, and an expert in that
tions. The presence of the seal provided by this
foreign language or code is not reasonably availsubsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the
able during the interception period, minimizaabsence of one, is a prerequisite for the use or
tion may be accomplished aa soon aa practicable
disclosure of the contents of any wire, electronic
titer the interception
or oral communication or evidence derived from
(e) An interception under this chapter may be
it under Subeection 7?-23a-9(3)
conducted in whole or in part by government per(b) Applications made and orders granted unsonnel, or by an individual operating under a
der this chapter shall be sealed by the judge Cuecontract with the government, acting under sutody of the application* and orders shall be where
pervision of an investigative or law enforcement
the judge direct*. The application* and orders
officer authorized to conduct the interception
shall be disclosed only upon a showing of good
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cause before a judge of competent jurisdiction
and may not be destroyed, except on order of the
issuing or denying judge But in any event they
shall be kept for ten years
(c) Any violation of any provision of this subsection msy be punished as contempt of the issuing or denying judge
(d) Within a reasonable tune, but not later
than 90 days after the filing of an application for
an order o( approval under Subsection
77-23a-l(X7) that is denied or the termination of
the period of an order or extensions, the issuing
or denying judge shall cause to be served on the
persons named in the order or the application,
and other parties to intercepted communications
as the judge determines in his discretion is in the
interest of justice, an inventory, which shall include notice of
(1) the entry of the order or application,
(u) the date of the entry and the period of
authorization, approved or disapproved interception, or the denial of the application,
and
(ui) that during the penod wire, electronic, or oral communications were or were
not intercepted.
(e) The judge, upon filing of a motion, may in
his discretion make available to the person or his
counsel for inspection the portion* of the intercepted communications, applications, and orders
the judge determines to be in the interest of justice On an ex parte showing of good cause to a
judge of competent jurisdiction the serving of the
inventory required by this subsection may be
postponed
(9) The contents of any intercepted wire, electronic, or oral communication, or evidence derived
from any of them, may not be received in evidence or
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in a federal or state court unless each party,
not less than ten days before the trial, hearing, or
proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the
court order, and accompanying application, under
which the interception was authorized or approved.
This ten-day period may be waived by the judge if he
finds that it was not possible to furnish the party
with the above information ten days before the trial,
hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be
prejudiced by the delay in receiving the information.
(10) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the United States Utah, or a political subdivision, may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire, electronic, or oral
communication, or evidence denved from any of
them, on the grounds that
(l) the communication was unlawfully intercepted,
(u) the order of authorization or approval
under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face, or
(in) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or
approval
(b) The motion shall be made before the trial,
hearing, or proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make the motion or the person was not
aware of the grounds of the motion If the motion
is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire,
electronic or oral communication, or evidence
denved from any of them, shall be treated as
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having been obtained in violation of this chapter
The judge, upon the filing of the motion by the
aggrieved person, may in his discretion make
available to the aggrieved person or his counsel
for inspection portions of the intercepted communication or evidence denved from them as the
judge determines to be in the interests of justice
(c) In addition to any other nght to appeal, the
state may appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress made under Subsection (lOXa),
or the denial of an application for an order of
approval, if the attorney bringing the appeal certifies to the judge or other official granting the
motion or denying the application that the appeal is not taken for the purposes of delay The
appeal shall be taken within 30 days after the
date the order was entered, and shall be diligently prosecuted
(d) The remedies and sanctions descnbed in
this chapter regarding the interception of electronic communications are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter involving these communications
(11) The requirements of Subsections UXbXu), and
(2)(d), and (3Kb) of this section relating to the specification of the facilities from which, or the place where
the communication is to be intercepted do not apply
if

(a) in the case of an applicant regarding the
interception of an oral communication,
d) the application is by a law enforcement
officer and is approved by the state attorney
general, a deputy attorney general, a county
attorney, or a deputy county attorney,
(u) the application contains a full and
complete statement of why the specification
is not practical, and identifies the person
committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted,
(in) the judge finds that the specification
is not practical, and
(b) in the case of an apphcaUon regarding wire
or electronic communication,
d) the application is by a law enforcement
officer and is approved by the state attorney
general, a deputy attorney general, a county
attorney, or a deputy county attorney;
(u) the application identifies the person
believed to be committing the offense and
whose communications are to be intercepted,
and the applicant makes a showing of a purpose, on the part of that person, to thwart
interception by changing facilities, and
(ui) the judge finds that the purpose has
been adequately shown.
(12) (a) An interception of a communication under
an order regarding which the requirements of
Subsections UXbXu), (2Kd), and (3Kb) do not apply by reason of Subsection (11), does not begin
until the facilities from which, or the place
where, the communication is to be intercepted is
ascertained by the person implementing the interception order
(b) A provider of wire or electronic communications service that has received an order under
Subsection (11Kb) may move the court to modify
or quash the order on the ground that its assistance with respect to the interception cannot be
performed in a timely or reasonable fashion. The
court, upon notice to the government, shall deads the motion expeditiously
isss
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77-23a-ll. Civil remedy for unlawful interception — Action for relief.
(1) Except under Subaection 77-23a-4<2)(b), a person whoee wire, electronic, or oral communication ta
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from
the person or entity that engaged in the violation,
relief as appropriate
(2) In an action under this section appropriate relief includes
(a) preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief, as is appropriate,
(b) damages under Subsection (3) and punitive
damages in appropriate cases, and
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee and reasonably
incurred litigation costs
(3) (a) In an action under this section, if the conduct in violation of this chapter is the private viewing
of a private satellite video communication that is not
scrambled or encrypted, or if the communication is a
radio communication that is transmitted on frequencies allocated under Subpart (D), Part 74, Rules of the
Federal Communications Commission, that is not
scrambled or encrypted, and the conduct is not for a
tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of direct or
indirect commercial advantage or private commercial
gain, the court shall assess damages as follows
d) if the person who engaged in the conduct has not previously been enjoined under
Subsection 77-23a-4<5) and has not been
found liable in a prior avil action under this
section, the court shall assess the greater of
the sum of actual damages suffered by the
plaintiff, or the statutory damages of not less
than $50 nor more than 1500,
(u) if on one pnor occasion the person who
engaged in the conduct has been enjoined
under Subsection 77-23a-4(5) or has been liable in a cml action under this section, the
court shall sssesi the greater of the sum of
actual damages suffered by the plaintiff, or
statutory damages of not less than $100 and
not more than $1,000,
(b) In any other action under this section, the
court may assess as damages whichever is the
greater of
d) the sum of the actual damages suffered
by the plaintiff and any profits made by the
violator as a result of the violations or
(u) statutory damages of $100 a day for
each day of violation, or $10,000, whichever
is greater.
(4) A good faith reliance on
(a) a court order, a grand jury subpoena, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization,
(b) a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer under Subsection 77-23a-10(7)f
or
(c) a good faith determination that Subaection
77-23a-4(3) permitted the conduct complained of
and is a complete defense against any civil or
criminal action brought under this chapter or
any other law
(5) A civil action under this section may not be
commenced later than two years after the date upon
which the claimant first has a reasonable opportunity
to discover the violation.
isas
77-23a*12. Enjoining a violation — Civil action
by attorney general
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(1) When it appears that a person is engaged or la
about to engage in any act that constitutes or will
constitute a felony violation of this chapter, the attorney general may initiate a civil action in a district
court of the state to enjoin the violation.
(2) The court shall proceed ss soon aa practicable to
the hearing and determination of the action, and
may, at any time before final determination, enter a
restraining order or prohibition, or take other action
aa warranted to prevent a continuing and substantial
injury to the state or to any person or class of persons
for whose protection the action is brought
(3) A proceeding under this section is governed by
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, except if an information has been filed or an indictment has been returned against the respondent, discovery is governed
by the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
ISSS
77-23a-13. Installation of device when court order required — Penalty.
(1) Except as provided in this section, a person may
not install or use a pen register or trap or trace device
without previously obtaining a court order under Section 77-23a-15, or under federal law
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the uae of a pen
register or trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or wire communications services.
(a) relating to the operation, maintenance, and
testing of a wire or electronic communications
service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider, or to the protection of users
of that service from abuse of service or unlawful
uae of service, or
(b) to record that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed to protect the
provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication,
or a user of that service from fraudulent, unlawful, or abusive use of that service, or
(c) when the consent of the user of that service
has been obtained.
(3) A knowing or intentional violation of Subsection (1) is a class A misdemeanor
isas
77-23e>14. Court order for installation — Application,
(1) The attorney general, a deputy attorney general, a county attorney, a deputy county attorney, or
a prosecuting attorney for a political subdivision of
the state, or a law enforcement officer, may make
application for an order or extension of an order under Section 77-23a-15 authorizing or approving the
installation and use of a pen register or trap and
trace device, in writing and under oath or equivalent
affirmation, to a court of competent jurisdiction
(2) An application under Subsection (1) shall include
(a) the identity of the attorney for the government or the law enforcement or investigative officer making the application and the identity of
the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation, and
(b) a certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an
ongoing criminal investigation being conducted
by that agency
isas
77-23a-l& Order for installation — Contents —
Duration — Extension — Disclosure.
(1) In general, upon in application made under
Section 77-23a-14, the court shall enter an ax parte
order authorizing the installation and uae of a pen
register or trap and trace device within the junadic-
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tion of the court, if the court finds that the attorney
for the government or the law enforcement or investigative officer has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by the installation and
use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation
(2) (a) An order issued under this section shall
specify
(1) the identity, if known, of the person to
whom is leased or in whose name is listed
the telephone line to which the pen register
or trap and trace device is to be attached,
(u) the identity, if known, of the person
who is the subject of the criminal investigation,
(ui) the number and, if known, physical
location of the telephone line to which the
pen register or trap and trace device is to be
attached and, in the case of a trap and trace
device, the geographical limits of the trap
and trace order; and
dv) a statement of the offense to which the
information likely to be obtained by the pen
register or trap and trace device relates
(b) The order shall direct, upon the request of
the applicant, the furnishing of information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register or
trap and trace device under Section 77 -23a-16
(3) (a) An order issued under this section may authorize the installation and use of a pen register
or trap and trace device for a period not to exceed
60 days
(b) Extensions of an order may be granted, but
only upon an application for an order under Section 77-23a-14 and upon the judicial finding required by Subsection (1) The period of extensi6n
shall be for a penod not to exceed 60 days
(4) An order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device
shall direct that
(a) the order be sealed until otherwise ordered
by the court, and
(b) the person owning or leasing the line to
which the pen register or trap and trace device is
attached, or who has been ordered by the court to
provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose
the existence of the pen register or trap and trace
device or the existence of the investigation to the
listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless
otherwise ordered by the court
isss
77-23a-16. Communications provider — Cooperation and support services — Compensation — Liability defense
(1) Upon the request of an attorney for the government or an officer of a law enforcement agency authorized to install and use pen registers under this chaptar, a provider of wire or electronic communications
service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall furmah investigative or law enforcement officers forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the
pen register unobtrusively and with a minimum of
interference with the services the person ordered by
the court accords the party regarding whom the installation and use is to take place, if such assistance
is directed by a court order as provided in Subsecuon
77-23a-15(2Xb) of this chapter
(2) (a) Upon request of an attorney for the government or an officer of a law enforcement agency
authorized to receive the results of a trap and
trace device under this chapter, a provider of
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wire or electronic communications service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall install the
device forthwith on the appropriate line.
(b) He shall also furnish the investigative or
law enforcement officer all additional information, facilities, and technical assistance, including installation and operation of the device unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference
with the services that the person so ordered by
the court accords the party with respect to whom
the installation and use is to take place, if the
installation and assistance is directed by a court
order under Subsection 77-23a-15(2)(b)
(c) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the
results of the trap and trace device shall be furnished to the officer of the law enforcement
agency designated by the court, at reasonable intervals and during regular business hours, for
the duration of the order
(3) A provider of wire or electronic communications service, landlord, custodian, or other person who
furnishes facilities or technical assistance under this
section shall be reasonably compensated for reasonable expenses incurred in providing the facilities and
assistance
(4) A cause of action does not lie in any court
against the provider of wire or electronic communications service, its officers, employees, agents, or other
specified persons, for providing information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with the terms of a
court order under this chapter
(5) A good faith reliance on a court order, a legislative authorization, or a statutory authorization, is a
complete defense against any civil or criminal action
brought under this chapter or any other law
isss
CHAPTER 23b
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS
Section
77-23b-l
77-23b-2
77-23b-3
77-23b-4
77-23b-5
77-23b-€.
77-23b-7
77-23b-8
77-23b-9

Definitions.
Interference with access to stored communication — Offenses — Penalties
Revealing stored electronic communication — Prohibitions — Penalties
Disclosure by a provider — Grounds for
requiring disclosure — Court order
Backup copy of communications —
When required of provider — Court
order — Procedures
Notifying subscriber or customer of
court order — Requested delay —
Grounds — Limits
Fee for services of provider of information.
Violation of chapter — Civil action by
provider or subscriber — Good faith
defense.
Judicial scope of chapter remedies and
sanctions,

77.23b-l. Definitions.
(1) Terms used in this chapter and defined in Section 77-23a-3 have the definitions given in that section
(2) As used in this chapter, the term ''remote computing service" means provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an
electronic communications system.
isss

SECTION II
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNT, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, EXPARTE,
IN THE MATTER OF:
TELEPHONE NUMBER (801) 731-4739
LISTED TO SHERRY BLIVEN
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 NO. 5900 W.
WEST WARREN, UTAH
BILLED TO: SHERRY BLIVEN
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 NO. 5900 W.
WEST WARREN, UTAH

APPLICATION FOR AN
EXPARTE ORDER
AUTHORIZING THE
INTERCEPTION OF WIRE
(TELEPHONIC)
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND
FROM TELEPHONE NUMBER

(801) 111-1*729

Comes now Donald C. Hughes, Weber County Attorney, being duly sworn,
deposes and says:

That he, Donald C. Hughes, is the County Attorney for Weber County, State
of Utah.

That he, Donald C. Hughes, has read the sworn Affidavit which is hereby
incorporated by reference of Glen M. Warner, a peace officer with Ogden City
Police Department, State of Utah, and that he is known to him to be a sworn
peace officer in the State of Utah.

That he, Donald C. Hughesr has read the Application for an Exparte Order
authorizing interception of wire (telephonic) communication on telephone number
(801) 731-1»739, and the accompanying sworn Affidavit of Glen M. Warner in
connection with that Application, and the Exparte Order authorizing the
interception of wire (telephonic) communications on (801) 731-^739, all of
which are listed in the incorporated Affidavit and incorporated into this
Application.

That he, Donald C. Hughes, believes the information contained in this
Application, including the documents referred to in Paragraph (2) of this
Application, indicate that crimes involving illegal drugs, to wit:

violations of

Utah Controlled Substance Act, Section 58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
Amended, and the Law of Conspiracy to violate the Controlled Substance Act in
violation of Section 76-M-201, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, and the
soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding the
commission of the above enumerated crimes in violation of Section 76-2-202, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, involving the possession of controlled substances
with intent to distribute, to wit:

cocaine; the conspiracy to commit these

offenses and soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally
aiding the commission of these offenses, all of which are felonies, punishable
by more than one year in the Utah State Prison, have been committed, are being
committed, and will be committed in the future.

That he, Donald C. Hughes, based upon the foregoing, believes that evidence
of the heretofore mentioned crimes may be obtained by interception of wire
(telephonic) communication and interception of such communications pursuant
to Section 77-23a-10 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, and Title III of
Public Law 90-351 U, S, Code.

That the communications to be intercepted are telephone conversations
held over the telephone bearing the number (801) 731-**739, located at the
residence at 1096 No. 5900 W., West Warren, Weber County, Utah, which is a
single family, rambler style, dwelling located in an agricultural area of
Weber County, Utah and listed to and billed to Sherry Bliven.

That other investigative techniques, as set out in detail in the accompanying
Affidavit and incorporated herein, have been tried and failed or resonably
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appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or too dangerous.

That the authorization to intercept these wire (telephonic) communications
be permitted for a period of thirty (30) days, tweaty-four (2k) hours a day,
and not to terminate upon the initial interception of incriminating" conversations
of David J. Hunt and other co-conspiritors, and others known and as yet unknown
or unidentified who are selling them or applying them or are buying from them
or being supplied by them controlled substances, to wit:

cocaine.

Based upon the facts contained in the sworn Affidavit of Glen M. Warner,
incorporated fully herein by reference, there is probable cause to believe that
this is a continuing, ongoing, criminal conspiracy engaged in the distribution
and purchase of controlled substances, to wit:

cocaine, and that additional

communications of the same type sought to be intercepted will occur after the
sought after communications have been first obtained.

_. That no previous applications to intercept communications involving the
telephone referred to herein have been made or issued.

Further, that in order to aid in reaching the objectives or the applied
for Order, and to aid in minimizing the interception of communications not
authorized to be intercepted, your applicant requests that that Order authorize
both the installation of a Pen Register (number dialed recorder) on the communications facilities designated in the supporting Affidavits in order to locate
and identify other communications facilities associated with outgoing telephone
calls, and toll record information pertaining to telephone number (801) 731-^739
listed to Sherry Bliven, located at 1096 No. 5900 W., West Warren, Weber County,
Utah.

Therefore, it is specifically requested that Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Company be directed to furnish Ogden City Police Department all

information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish
the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the
services that such company is according to the personpr persons whose communications are to be intercepted.

,._

WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY ( S ^

w/
//

STATE OF UTAH
SS.
COUNTY OF WEBER

The above person

3

me, and subscribed and jiworn here to this -J&
1986, by

personally appeared before
day of

"'

NOTARY f$BLIC
My commission expires:

<*JwJn

\JUsCty~

DONALD C. HUGHES
Weber County Attorney
7th Floor Municipal Bldg.
Ogdenf Utah 84401
(801) 399-8377

SECEND JUDICIAL DISTRICT (DUET OF WEBER ODUMTY, STATE OF UTAH

State of Utah, Exparte

MOTION NDNC HO TONC

IN THE MATTER OF:
TELEFHCNE WVBER (801) 731-4739
LISTED TO SHERRY BLIVEN AT SHE
ADERESS OF 1096 N. 5900 W.,
WEST WARREN, UTAH.

Case No.

(DMES NCW, Donald C . .Hughes, J r . , Weber County Attorney, and moves the
Court for an order Nunc Pro Tunc.

I t appears that the original application i n

the above-entitled matter upon which the Court granted the original intercept
order, was not fully executed.
direction.

Die dociment was prepared and r e v i s e d under iry

I conversed with the Honorable John F. Wahlquist concerning our

support for the intercept and i n conjunction with Sergeant Glen M. Warner, the
affiant in a l l of the supporting affidavits presented the application t o Judge
Wahlquist t o secure the order.

I f u l l y approved the application i n i t s final

form, but due t o a c l e r i c a l oversight the final draft accanparying the Judge1 s
order was not executed.

MDTIDN
Bage TWO

THEREFORE, i t i s hereby moved that the original cbcunent new be executed ty
nyself with i t s effect Nine Pro Tuic.
DATED this 26th day of July, 1986.

Weber County Attorney
QREER

Upon the reading of the Motion of Donald C Hughes, Jr., and good cause
appearing,
IT IS HEREBY OREERED that Donald C. Hughes, Jr., execute the original
Application forthwith to have been effective Nunc Pro Tunc to May 23, 1986 at
1209 hours.
EATED this 26th day of July, 1986.

FILED
C W yat !f*i-Covri
Ufr* C&ert of A W t f s 1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS'
ooOoo
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

ORDER
Case No. 880386-CA

David J. Hunt#
Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Orme, Garff and Davidson (On Law and Motion).

This matter is before the court on appellant's Application
for Continuation of a Certificate of Probable Cause, which was
transferred from the Utah Supreme Court on November 6, 1989.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the remittitur issued by this
court on October 30, 1989 is recalled as improvidently granted
under the circumstances of this case, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the remittitur shall be stayed
up to and including December 4, 1989, which is the period
allowed by the Utah Supreme Court for filing of a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari in this case, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT a further stay of the
remittitur shall be in accordance with the terms of R. Utah Ct.
App. 36(c) providing for stay pending disposition of a petition
for writ of certiorari.
DATED this

j£f

FOR THE COURT:

Gregor

Orme, Judge

day of November, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on 16, November 1989 I mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by depositing the same with
the United States Mail, postage prepaid to the following:

Randine Salerno
Attorney for Appellant
2568 Washington Blvd., #205
Ogden, UT 84401
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
Dan R. Larsen
Assistant Attorney General
B U I L D I N G
MAIL
Honorable David E. Roth
Second District Court
2549 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401
Second District Court
Court Clerk
2549 Washington Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401
Case No. 17750

DATED this 16th day of November, 1989.

By
Kathleen Flynn
Deputy Court Clerk
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SECTION II
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAT, EXPARTE'4

APPLICATION FOR AN
EXPARTE ORDER
AUTHORIZING THE
EXTENSION OF THE
INTERCEPTION OF WIRE
(TELEPHONIC)
COMMUNICATIONS TO AND
FROM TELEPHONE NUMBER
(801) 731-^739

IN THE MATTER -.OF:
TELEPHONE NUMBER (801) 731-^739
LISTED TO SHERRY BLIVEN
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 NO. 5900 W.
West Warren, Utah
BILLED TO: SHERRY BLIVEN
AT THE ADDRESS OF 1096 No. 5900 W.
West Warren, Utah

<)

Comes now William F. Daines, a duly authorized deputy Weber Co. attorney,
being duly sworn, deposes and says:
that he, William F. Daines, is a deputy County Attorney for Weber County, State of Utah.
That he, William F. Daines has read the sworn affidavit which is hereby incorporated
by reference of Glen M. Warner, a peace officer with Ogden City Police Department
State of Utah, and that he is known to him to be a sworn peace officer in the State
of Utah.
That he, William F. Daines, has read the Application for an Exparte Order authorizing
interception of wire (telephonic) communication on telephone number (801) 731-^739,
and the accompanying sworn affidavit of Glen M. Warner in connection with that
Application, and the exparte order authorizing the interception of wire (telephonic)
communications on (801)731-^739, all of which are listed in the incorporated
Affidavit and incorporated into the Application.
That he, William F. Daines, believes the information in this Application, including
the documents referred to in paragraph (2) of this Application, indicate that crimes
involving illelal drugs, to wit: violations of Utah Controlled Substance Act, Section

58-37-8, Utah Code Annotated. 1953 as Amended, and the Law of Conspiracy to violate
the Controlled Substance Act in violation of Section 76-4-201, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 AS AMENDED, and the soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging ot
intentionally aiding the comission of the above enumerated crimes in violation
of Section 76-2-202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended, involving the possession
of controlled substances with intent to distribute, to wit: cocaine; the conspiracy
to comit these offenses and soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging or
intentionally aiding the commission of these offenses, all of which are felonies,
punishable by more htan one year in the Utah State Prison, have been committed,
are being committed, and will be committed in the future.
That he, William F. Daines, based upon the foregoing, believes that evidence of
the heretofore mentioned crimes may be obtained by interception of wire (telephonic)
communication and interception of such communications pursuant to Section
77-23a-10 Utah Code Annotated,

1953 as Amended, and Title III of Public Law 90-351

U.S. Code.
That the communications to be intercepted are telephone conversations held over the
telephone bearing the number 801 731-4739, locatedJ.at the residence at 1096N 5900 W.
West Warren, Weber County, Utah, which is a single fanily, rambler style, dwelling
located in an agricultural area of Weber County, Utah and listed too and billed to
Sherry Bliven.
That *ther investigative techniques, as set out in detail in the accompanying
Affidavit and incorporated herein, have been tried and failed or reasona^by appear
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or too dangerous.
That the authorization to intercept these wire (telephonic) communications be
permitted for a period of thirty (30) days, twenty four (24) hours a day and
not to terminate upon the initial interception of incriminating converstiaons
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of David J. Hunt and otner co-conspiritors, and others known and as yet unknown
or unidentified who are selling them or applying them or are buying f^pom them
or being supplied by them controlled substances, to wit: cocaine.
Based upon the facts contained in the sworn affidavit of Glen M. Warner.incorporated
fully herein by reference, there is probable cause to believe that this is
a continuing, ongoing, criminal conspiracy engaged in the distribution and
purchase of controlled substances, to wit: cocaine, and that additionalcommunications
of the same type sought to be intercepted will occur after thesought after comraunicatior
have been first obtained.
The previous application for interception of telephonic communications is the
one for which an order was granted on May 23, 1986, to become effective May
29, 1986. This application is for an order extending that granted application.
No other applications are known to your affiant.
A statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the original interception
are found in the affidavit for extension, which is incorporated herein.
Further, that in order to aid in reaching the objectives of the applied for order,
and to aid in minimizing the interception of communications not authorized to
be intercepted, your applicant requests that that order authorize both the installation
of a pen register (number dialed recorder) on the communications facilities
designated in the supporting Affidavits in order to locate and identify other
communications facilities associated with outgoing telephone calls, and toll record
information pertaining to telephone numben(80l) 731-^739 listed to Sherry Bliven,
located at 1096N 5900 W., West Warren, Weber County, Utah
Therefore, it is specifically requested that Mountain States Telephone and telegraph
Company be directed to furnish Ogden City Police Department all information,
facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception •'
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urr^btrusively
i s arccoMing t

witn a r.iX^ftum of interS^e/ence with \ h * s e r v i c e s t\ay'sucn ccr.fcar.y
person /r^S^ersons who/e e<^unicatzonfc are to b/ i n t e r c e p t e d .

SItrr

dLA^AXd

ULHITY WLritH LUUNTi ATTUHNtY

STATE OF UTAH
)
)

COUNTY OF WEBER

The above person h),'fJiyi^m

) . 7- jQnt^j^a^

and subscribed and sworn to this

1986, by

SS,

personally appeared before me,

J? 7 £%s day of (T^UST^U/

(j@4/,Mi/^<?%yffito

NOTARY PUBLIC
My commission expires:

*f

•

W /, /?f?
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